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OKLAHOMA
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 52 SUMMER, 1999 NUMBER 2
THE EFFECT OF PRESIDENTIAL PARDONS ON
DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION: IS OUR
CYNICISM JUSTIFIED?
CHARLES D. BERGER*
The President ... shall have Power to Grant Reprieves and Pardons
for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeach-
ment.'
Humanity and good policy conspire to dictate that the benign
prerogative of pardoning should be as little as possible fettered or
embarrassed.?
Hamilton's conception of the pardoning power as "the benign prerogative" may
seem oddly naYve to the modem reader; conventional wisdom now has it that the
pardon is anything but benign. Following a string of perceived abuses of the
pardon, it has become the object of widespread suspicion and cynicism. The sources
of ihis distrust are several. To begin with, there is the apparently unchecked nature
of the power. While a President may be impeached, neither Congress nor the courts
can undo a pardon already granted. This raises balance of powers concerns; one
commentator has noted that the pardon power gives the President the ultimate veto
over criminal legislation, insofar as he can pardon everyone who is convicted under
a law with which he disagrees?
Then there is the perceived infrequency of its use. In recent history, most people
can probably recall only President Ford's pardon of President Nixon and President
Bush's pardon of six of the Iran-Contra conspirators, both of which were widely
* Alexander von Humboldt Foundation Federal Chancellor Fellow, University of Frankfurt,
Germany. J.D., 1998, Yale Law School; B.A., 1994, Wesleyan University. The author wishes to thank
Akhil Amar and Margaret Colgate Love for reviewing earlier drafts of this article.
1. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2.
2. THE FEDERAUST No. 74, at 447 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
3. See William F. Duker, The President's Power to Pardon: A Constitutional History, 18 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 475, 530 (1977). Thomas Jefferson used the pardon in such a programmatic fashion when
he pardoned all those who violated the Alien and Sedition Act. See id.
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criticized acts. Some might further remember the pardon of Jimmy Hoffa,' or
President Carter's amnesty for those who violated selective service laws during the
Vietnam War Few, however, are aware of the regularized practice of granting
pardons Historically, most Presidents averaged fifty to two hundred pardons per
year, though this has dropped precipitously in recent administrations.7
Some language by the Supreme Court may further contribute to a perception of
the pardon power as a dangerous relic of the English monarchy. In United States
v. Wilson, the Court spoke of the power as an "act of grace.... It is the private,
though official, act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose
benefit it is intended ... ."' This passage was reiterated as late as 1915 in Burdick
v. United States."o The language is puzzling; what does it mean that a pardon is
a "private, though official, act"? In both Wilson and Burdick, the pardon is spoken
of as a deed which must be accepted to have effect, almost like a gift from the
President to the reci;pient. This talk of quasi-private action, of mixing the public and
private acts of the executive, may seem anachronistic and calls into question the
continued appropriateness of a pardon power vested solely in the President."
4. See Leonard Boudin, The Presidential Pardons of James R. Hoffa and Richard M. Nixon: Have
the Limitations on the Fardon Power been Exceeded?, 48 U. CoLO. L. REV. 1, 21-34 (1976), for a
statement of facts and ccmmentary on the Hoffa pardon.
5. See Proclamation Granting Pardon for Violations of the Selective Service Act, August 4, 1964-
March 28, 1973, 33 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 7-1 (1977); Richard A. Saliterman, Reflections on the
Presidential Clemency Fower, 38 OKLA L. REv. 257 (1985); G. Sidney Buchanan, The Nature of a
Pardon Under the United States Constitution, 39 OHio ST. LJ. 36, 61-62 (1978).
6. The Department of Justice has a permanent Office of the Pardon Attorney, with staff attorneys
reviewing petitions submitted pursuant to federal regulations and forwarding recommendations through
the Attorney General to the President. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-1.10 (1998) (detailing eligibility criteria,
submissions procedures, and notification requirements for pardon petitions). Although the regulations
are advisory and do not estrict the President's authority to grant pardons, see 28 C.F.R. §1.10 (1998);
Yelvington v. Presidential Pardon and Parole Attorneys, 211 F.2d 642, 643 (D.C. Cir. 1954), the
recommendations of the Department of Justice are often followed.
7. President Nixon granted 926 and Carter 534, while Reagan granted only 393 during his two
terms, and Bush a scant 62 in four years. See Linda L. Ammons, Discretionary Justice: A Legal and
Policy Analysis of a Governor's Use of the Clemency Power in the Cases of Incarcerated Battered
Women, 3 J.L. & PoL'Y 1, 118 n.182 (1994). President Clinton has granted 110 pardons through the end
of 1998. See Kalpana STinivasan, Arkansan among Clinton's Pardons, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 28,
1998, available in 1998 WL 7474529. On the decline in the incidence of pardons, see Margaret Love,
A Place for Pardons, WASH. PoST, Dec. 21, 1998, at A29.
8. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150 (1833).
9. Id. at 160.
10. See Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79, 89-90 (1915).
11. The nineteenth-century conception of the pardon has not gone unchallenged. Justice Holmes,
for example, stated in Bhidle v. Perovich:
A pardon in our days is not a private act of grace from an individual happening to possess
power. It is a part of the Constitutional scheme, When granted it is the determination of
the ultimate authority that the public welfare will be better served by inflicting less than
what the judgment fixed.... Just as the original punishment would be imposed without
regard to the prisoner's consent and in the teeth of his will, whether he liked it or not, the
public welfare, nct his consent determines what shall be done.
[Vol. 52:163
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The core concern of these criticisms is the fear that a President may use the
pardon power to his own personal advantage. In particular, they illustrate an anxiety
that a President may cover up damaging information about his administration or
himself personally by a timely grant of executive clemency. By pardoning his
cronies before trial, or pardoning contemnors or perjurers who impede the course
of an investigation, the argument goes, a President can prevent such damaging
disclosures from coming to light. A President might be especially interested in
suppressing information which could lead to criminal indictment, impeachment
proceedings, or even civil liability for himself. Taking this into account, the
unfettered pardon power might be considered by some the most insidious power of
all, since it could be used to undermine the impeachment process itself, the final
check on a corrupt or abusive President."
I believe this objection to the pardon power to be fundamentally misplaced.
Limitations inherent in the pardon power itself, in combination with the political
checks of impeachment and electoral accountability, make such abuse a remote
possibility at best. Part I of this article spells out the objection to the pardoning
power in greater detail, with focus on the Nixon and Iran-Contra pardons and the
various calls for amendment and reform of the pardoning power. Part II answers
the objection by examining alternate methods of extracting information as well as
the characteristics of a pardon and political checks that inhibit its use as a device
to conceal information. Part III takes a second look at the Nixon and Iran-Contra
pardons, as well as speculation about various pardons Clinton could have granted
during his various scandals, in light of the principles set forth in part If.
I. The Malevolence of the Benign Prerogative?
George Mason, as one of his reasons for refusing to sign the Constitution, stated
that the pardoning power was too expansive, and would allow the President to
pardon "those whom he had secretly instigated to commit" crimes and "thereby
prevent a discovery of his own guilt." 3 Mason lost, of course; the Constitution was
signed and ratified, but his views on the pardon power have gained wide currency.
Paul Finkelman writes, for example, that "President Gerald R. Ford's pardon of ex-
President Richard M. Nixon and President George Bush's pardon of the Iran-Contra
conspirators illustrate the dangers Mason foresaw."'4 The Nixon and Iran-Contra
pardons are indeed at the heart of the current disenchantment with executive
clemency; speculation that President Clinton could or should have pardoned
Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 485 (1927). Still, Holmes' view has not been universally applied. The
holding in Burdick that a pardon may be rejected remains good law, subject only to the exception carved
out by Biddle for commutation of a sentence. See, e.g., Hoffa v. Saxbe, 378 F. Supp. 1221, 1242 (D.D.C.
1974) (affirming the necessity of acceptance for validity of a pardon).
12. See Duker, supra note 3, at 525 n.258.
13. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 639 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed.
1966) (statement of George Mason, Sept. 15, 1787).
14. Paul Finkelman, Intentionalism, the Founders, and Constitutional Interpretation, 75 TEx. L.
REv. 435, 453 n.105 (1996) (reviewing JACK N. RAKOvE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITCS AND IDEAS
IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSITrUT1ON (1996)).
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witnesses who refused to testify against him (Susan McDougal) or who may have
perjured themselves (Monica Lewinsky) in assorted Clinton scandals demonstrates
the ongoing nature of the controversy over executive clemency.
A. The Pardon of Richard Nixon
On September 3, 1974, President Gerald Ford granted former President Richard
Nixon a "full, free and absolute pardon .. .for all offenses which he ... has
committed or may have committed or taken part in" during his presidency.'5 The
pardon was the final act in the Watergate drama, which had begun over two years
earlier with a bungled burglary attempt at the Democratic National Committee
headquarters at the Watergate Hotel. Investigation of the matter revealed probable
White House involvement in the burglary attempt, as well as a web of other
burglaries, money laundering operations, and other assorted misconduct. 6 With
impeachment proceedings pending, and almost certain to succeed, Nixon resigned
on August 9, 1974. The pardon came a scant thirty days later, ending any chance
of a criminal prosecution, at least in the eyes of Watergate special prosecutor Leon
Jaworski.'7
Reaction to the pardon was overwhelmingly critical." The House Subcommittee
on Criminal Justice conducted hearings concerning the propriety of the pardon, as
well as its effect on the then still-ongoing Watergate investigation. One consistent
theme throughout the hearings was the possibility that the pardon would prevent
further information about Watergate from coming to light. For example, Rep. John
Bingham (D.-N.Y.) explained that
[millions of people are outraged by the pardon not simply because it
seems to prevent Nixon from being summoned before a court to answer
for his conduct, but because it might forever protect the full story of the
Nixon administration's violations of the law and the Constitution from
full disclosure.... The American people still do not have all the facts
about the N xon Administration's misconduct, and without those facts
we cannot know their true magnitude and significance.'"
15. Proclamation No. 4311; 39 Fed. Reg. 32,601, 32,601-02 (1974).
16. See generally Hugh C. Macgill, The Nixon Pardon: Limits on the Benign Prerogative, 7 CONN.
L. REV. 56 (1974).
17. See id at 88. Although Jaworski did not press the issue, a number of other writers at the time
contended that the pardon was unconstitutional for various reasons, and that Nixon could in fact be
prosecuted. Rep. John Bingham (D.-N.Y.) recognized that the pardon would not bar an indictment
against Nixon, because a pardon has to be affirmatively pled to bar prosecution, and indictment comes
before pleading. He in fact advocated indicting Nixon as a means of challenging the constitutionality of
the pardon. See Pardon of Richard M. Nixon, and Related Matters: Hearings Before the House
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, 93d Cong. 54-55 (1975) (statement of Rep. John Bingham)
[hereinafter Hearings]. For a review of the arguments against the constitutionality of Nixon's pardon, see
Macgill, supra note 16.
18. Indeed, there is general agreement that the pardon played a significant role in Ford's 1976
electoral defeat. See Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the Pardoning Power
from the King, 69 TEx. L. Rev. 569, 617 (1991).
19. Hearings, supra note 17, at 57.
[V/ol. 52:163
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Bingham went on to note that even full disclosure of the Special Prosecutor's
findings would not allay his concerns, since the investigation had not yet reached
all allegations of misconduct, and Jaworski had not yet accessed much key
evidence, including the Nixon tapes and the testimony of Richard Nixon himself.?
Rep. William Hungate (D.-Mo.) echoed much the same sentiment: "Unless the
complete story of Watergate is known, history may incorrectly record the events of
these times.... The Congress has dealt responsibly with Watergate, but Watergate
will not be behind us until the record of Watergate is complete."'"
Professor Hugh Macgill also worried about the opportunity for Nixon to use the
pardon to suppress information and argued for its invalidation. Macgill believed
that, "[t]o the extent that more definite knowledge of Mr. Nixon's conduct in office,
through indictment or prosecution, would be a necessary purgative for the Republic,
the pardon should be set aside."' In addition to the damage done to the Watergate
investigation, Macgill was concerned that the vagueness and breadth of the pardon,
which covered all crimes Nixon committed or might have committed during his
presidency, might have "seriously impeded significant aspects of investigations
conducted by the Special Prosecutor's office, particularly in areas unrelated to
Watergate, which were not scrutinized in the cover-up conspiracy trial. .. "'
The need to firmly establish a record of the Watergate conspiracy for historical
reasons also impelled Judge Sirica, who presided over many of the Watergate cases
over the course of five years, to reflect negatively on the pardon: \
[N]o matter how long it took, [Nixon] should have stood trial.... After
a trial, after the best prosecution case possible had been presented, after
the best defense had been offered, after testimony and cross-examination
under oath had been completed, a final verdict would have put the
president's guilt or innocence beyond dispute. No one then could
wonder whether or not he had done wrong. No one, not even Nixon
himself, could any longer argue that his fate was the product of politics
rather then the result of justice being served2
20. See id. at 58. Interestingly, Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski himself had a contrary view,
approving of the pardon and arguing that a trial of Richard Nixon would have added very little to the
historical record, since Nixon could have invoked the Fifth Amendment, or pled nolo contendre or guilty.
See Karen Elliott, The Pardon of Nixon was Timely, Legal, Jaworski Believes, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16,
1974, at 1.
21. Hearings, supra note 17, at 1.
22. Macgill, supra note 16, at 91. Somewhat inconsistently, Macgill also recognized the possibility
that impeachment proceedings could have continued despite Nixon's resignation, and that such
proceedings would have been one way for Congress to pursue the investigation notwithstanding the
pardon, had it so chosen. See id. at 62.
23. Id. at 91-92. Nixon's pardon was nonspecific, covering "all offenses against the United States
which he, Richard Nixon, has committed or may have committed or taken part in during the period from
January 20, 1969 through August 9, 1974." Proclamation No. 4311, 39 Fed. Reg. 32,601 (1974).
Professor Duker wrote that there was a "reasonable doubt" as to the constitutionality of the pardon
because of its vagueness. See Duker, supra note 3, at 532.
24. JOHN J. SIRIcA, To SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT: THE BREAK-IN, THE TAPES, THE
CONSPIRATORS, THE PARDON 234-35 (1979).
1999]
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I.F. Stone argued that the pardon was invalid because it violated the impeachment
exception to the pardon power." Insofar as Nixon's resignation prevented such
investigation by means of impeachment proceedings, he claimed, only criminal
prosecution would have resulted in a full investigation into Nixon's misconduct.26
Because the pardon blocked criminal prosecution, Stone concluded, Nixon's pardon
violated the purpose of the impeachment exception as a device to prevent the
President from blocking legislative investigation into executive misconduct'
William Duker joined the chorus of anti-pardon sentiment, expressing concerns that
a President, "liable to impeachment for a reason other than abusive use of the
pardon, could, via the power, suppress a thorough investigation."'
What is interesting about these criticisms is that they are not about justice -
whether Nixon should ultimately have been held criminally liable for his misconduct
and punished - but about information. Arguably, the bulk of the critical commen-
tary on the Nixon pardon focuses on the "informational harm" supposedly facilitated
by the pardon. What I refer to as informational harm is a group of at least three
closely related injuries to society when information is withheld or concealed. First,
there is the immediate danger that pardoning one offender will hamper investigation
of other offenders, or other offenses by the same individual; this was one of
Macgill's worries. Second, there is the possibility that a practice of pardoning high
level executive officials will erode disincentives on official misconduct. The
supposed danger is not just that officials who commit crimes need not fear
punishment, but also that they need not fear the disgrace of having their misdeeds
publically exposed. Finally, there is a more general, long-term injury inflicted upon
democratic discourse when information is withheld and the historical record is
distorted. This is the thrust of Judge Sirica's criticism, as well as Congressmen
Bingham and Hungate's remarks.
B. The Iran-Contra Pardons
On December 24, 1992, outgoing President Bush granted Christmas Eve pardons
to former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and five other conspirators in
the Iran-Contra affair. The conspiracy centered around covert weapons sales to Iran,
made in the hopes of obtaining the release of American hostages in Lebanon.
Profits from these sales were funneled to the Contra rebels in Nicaragua, in
contravention of explicit congressional directives." The pardons came in the midst
of an ongoing investigation of the affair headed by special prosecutor Lawrence
Walsh, who had already obtained eleven convictions in the six-year-long inves-
25. See I.F. Stone, On Pardons and Testimony, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1974, at 43.
26. Stone's argument seems in this respect flawed, since impeachment proceedings could have been
commenced even after Nixon's resignation in order to deprive him of his pension and entitlements. See
Macgill, supra note 16, at 61-62.
27. See Stone, supra note 25.
28. Duker, supra note 3, at 525 n.258.
29. See James 14. Jorgensen, Federal Executive Clemency Power: The President's Prerogative to
Escape Accountabiliky, 27 U. RICH. L. R',. 345, 362-64 (1993), for a concise summary of the events
surrounding the Imn-Contra scandal.
[Vol. 52:163
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tigation.30 Five of the pardons went to individuals who had already been convicted,
but Weinberger's trial was still to come, and had been scheduled to begin on
January 5, 1993 - a mere two weeks after his pardon.
Walsh's reaction to the pardons was indignant. With the trial about to begin,
Walsh believed that the pardon was granted to prevent disclosure of Bush's role in
the scandal. As he later explained, "[t]he full extent of Bush's guidance of President
Reagan had not yet been adequately explored - by me or by Congress .... The
only way for him to avoid the revelations that would emerge at Weinberger's trial
would be to pardon Weinberger before the case went to trial."'" Defense counsel
for Weinberger had indeed stated that they would call Bush to testify at the trial?'
Even if Bush was not called to the witness stand, there was the chance that
Weinberger's own testimony would have proven embarrassing to Bush, or even led
to his indictment.
While there was brief discussion of calling Weinberger to testify before a grand
jury, there was a general consensus that by putting an end to Weinberger's
prosecution, Bush had also ended any realistic hope that Walsh or anybody else
would obtain accurate testimony from him.33 Walsh stated bluntly that "[tihe Iran-
Contra coverup ... has now been completed with the pardon of Caspar Wein-
berger," and that the pardon had "a devastating effect on the development of further
facets of the inquiry .... " Apparently deprived of the key information expected
to come to light during Weinberger's trial, Walsh closed his investigation shortly
after the pardon.35
Many critics of the pardon agreed with Walsh that Bush's primary motivation for
granting it was to conceal his' own role in the affair. A CNN-USA Today-Gallup
poll conducted shortly after the pardon found that half of those who had followed
the news believed that Bush's motive had been "to protect himself from legal
difficulties or embarrassment resulting from his own role in Iran-Contra."'
Professor Harold Koh wrote that the prosecution "would have answered, or at least
cast light upon," the critical question of Bush's "constitutional fidelity."37 Professor
Laurence Tribe stated that the framers "did not intend the power to pardon to enable
a President to cover his own tracks,"3 but concluded somewhat helplessly that the
pardon "definitely represents a significant abuse of presidential power, but not the
kind of abuse our system has provided any remedy for. It's just a disgrace. That's
all,"39 James Jorgensen worried about the danger that concealing information
30. See id. at 364.
31. LAWRENCE WALSH, FIREWALL: THE IRAN-CONTRA CONSPIRACY AND COVER-UP 467 (1997).
32. See id. at 487. *
33. See Saul Friedman, Pardon Pirouette: Walsh to Drop Iran-contra Prosecutions, NEWSDAY, Dec.
31, 1992, at 7.
34. Jorgensen, supra note 29, at 366.
35. See Friedman, supra note 33, at 7.
36. WALSH, supra note 31, at 504.
37. Harold H. Koh, Begging Bush's Pardon, 29 Hous. L. REV. 889, 890 (1992).
38. WALSH, supra note 31, at 507-08.
39. Id.
1999]
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"deprives the public and other branches of government of the opportunity to hold
their government accountable."'  Commentator Garry Wills, perhaps recalling
Stone's argument following Watergate, analyzed the pardon in balance of powers
terms, suggesting that the concealment of information by means of the pardon
violated the spirit, if not the letter, of the constitutional bar on pardons of impeach-
ment, insofar as it impeded Congress' duty to "police and, if necessary, punish the
behavior of the other departments" through impeachment proceedings' Without
belaboring the point any further, it is clear that the same sort of concerns about
informational harm that were voiced after Nixon's pardon - interference with other
investigations, erosion of disincentives against executive misconduct, withholding
of information from the public, and distortion of the historical record - are
prominent in commentary about the Iran-Contra pardons.
C. The Clinton Capers
President Clinton weathered the storm of controversy surrounding the Whitewater
and Lewinsky scandals without employing the pardon power to his advantage. This
was not for lack oF opportunity. While Susan McDougal was serving an eighteen-
month sentence fo: civil contempt for her refusal to answer certain questions about
the Clinton's real estate affairs before a grand jury, there was widespread
speculation that the President would reward her loyalty with a pardon. While
Clinton never commented on a pardon for McDougal, when asked pointedly about
the possibility, he refused to rule it out.42
There were also hints that Clinton could use the pardon power to hamper special
prosecutor Kenneth Starr's investigation into the Monica Lewinsky scandal. For
example, Terry Eastland argued that Clinton could have seriously impeded the
investigation in th,-. following manner:
[ulsing the pardon power, Clinton could insulate his friend Vernon
Jordan and other targets of Star's probe. He could also nullify the
prosecution of Susan McDougal, who remains in jail for contempt for
her refusal to testify about the Clintons .... Though pardons would not
put Starr out of business, they would subtract from his investigation
significantly 3
Others advocated that Clinton grant a pardon to Monica Lewinsky herself.
Andrew Shapiro cynically proposed that Clinton should have pardoned her in order
to silence her as a witness, thereby putting an end to Starr's inquiries. "[I]f
Clinton pardoned her," he maintained, "she wouldn't have to tell Starr a thing.'""
If she had been pardoned, the argument goes, Starr would have lost the promise of
40. Jorgensen, suptra note 29, at 367.
41. Garry Wills, Bush's Shameless Finale; The Pardons Undermine Constitutional Intent, WASH.
POST, Dec. 27, 1992, zi Cl.
42. See Pardon Possibility Raises Storm, MILWAUKEE J. & SENTINEL, Sep. 25, 1996, at 8.
43. Terry Eastland, Shooting Starr, WKLY. STANDARD, Feb. 9, 1998, at 14.
44. See Andrew L. Shapiro, Pardon Her, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 2, 1998, at II.
45. Id.
[Vol. 52:163
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immunity as a bargaining chip, and with it any hope of extracting useful information
from her, especially since he would have been barred from prosecuting Lewinsky
for any underlying offenses she might have committed, such as perjury or coercing
a government employee to lie under oath."
Finally, others suggested that Clinton might actually pardon himself for any
misdeeds he may have committed, or speculated about a pardon from Vice-President
Al Gore should Clinton have resigned or faced charges after his term of office had
elapsed.47 Of course, none of these speculative pardons ever came to fruition, but
the commentary surrounding them reinforces the notion of the pardon power as a
tool which a President can use to suppress information.
D. Calls for Reform
Not surprisingly, both the Nixon and Iran-Contra pardons were followed by a
flurry of suggestions concerning how to prevent future abuses of the pardon power.
After Nixon's pardon, at least two serious proposals for constitutional amendments
were raised in the Senate. Sen. William Proxmire (D.-Wis.) suggested that pardons
be limited to persons already convicted. 1 Ironically, the founders rejected such a
provision because they thought that pre-conviction pardons would be an aid to
investigations, in that they might be used to encourage the cooperation of
accomplices.4 In any case, the proposal is revealing. Since the only significant
difference between a pre-trial pardon and a post-conviction pardon is the tril itself,
and any testimony or evidence that may be brought to light during trial, the proposal
is clearly focused on remedying the supposed problem of suppressed disclosures.
Sen. Walter Mondale (D.-Minn.) proposed an even more sweeping amendment,
which would have granted Congress the power to nullify a pardon within 180 days
of its issuance by a majority of two-thirds of each House.' William Duker,
seeking to "rid the pardoning power of its apprehensible novelty," endorsed
Mondale's proposal in his important article on the constitutional history of the
pardon power."'
In reaction to the Iran-Contra pardons, James Jorgensen renewed the call to limit
the pardon power by allowing pardons only after indictment, trial, and conviction,
and additionally proposed a requirement that the President specify which crimes are
being pardoned.' Lawrence Walsh stopped short of suggesting a constitutional
46. See id.
47. See, e.g., C. Boyden Gray, The Difficulty of Doing a Deal, WALL ST. J., Sep. 28, 1998
(speculating on the possibility of Gore granting Clinton a pardon, or even Clinton pardoning himself).
48. See SJ. Res. 239, 93d Cong. (1974).
49. See Jorgensen, supra note 29, at 368 n.163. The Supreme Court has stated, albeit in dicta, that
pardons may be granted before conviction. See Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380 (1867).
See also Macgill, supra note 16, at 64-74, for a thorough discussion of the validity of pro-conviction
pardons.
50. See S.J. Res. 240, 93d Cong. (1974).
51. Duker, supra note 3, at 535-38.
52. See Jorgensen, supra note 29, at 368-70. There is some suggestion that specificity is already
required in grants of pardon. See Macgill, supra note 16, at 74-85; Boudin, supra note 4, at 34-36.
1999]
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amendment, but did advise that the public should at least extract promises from
presidential candidates that they would not grant any pardons before conviction. 3
While none of these proposals were ultimately adopted, cynicism about the
pardon power continues. As we have seen, Kenneth Starr's investigation of
President Clinton has led to another round of commentary about the abusive nature
of the power. Befoe accepting this analysis, however, the purported link between
pardons and informational harm should be scrutinized more closely.
I. Limitations on the President's Power to Conceal Information through the
Pardon Power
There are two groups of reasons why the pardon power will not operate to
prevent disclosure of information. The first is a set of internal limitations on the
pardon power itselF. There are restrictions on what offenses are pardonable. A
pardon can not be granted prospectively, for an offense not yet committed, and civil
contempt of court, amd probably contempt of Congress are not pardonable offenses.
There are also limitations on the effect of a pardon once granted. For example, a
pardon will not remove any nonpunitive consequences of having committed an
offense, such as disbarment. The second group of restraints on the pardon power
are political in nature - reasons why a President will not exercise what is within
his power. A President who abuses the pardon risks impeachment, even after he
leaves office, or at a minimum may suffer at the polls. Finally, the fact that a
pardon abrogates a witness' Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
makes pardon a twc-edged sword. In this section, I will review each of these factors
in turn and analyze their impact on the potential for use of the pardon to prevent
disclosure of information.
A. Pardon May Only Be Granted for Offenses Already Committed
The fact that a pardon cannot be granted prospectively, but instead only for an
offense already committed, limits the President's power to cover up damaging
information. Before explaining how this is so, an examination of the basis for the
rule against pre-commission pardons is warranted.
At first glance, it seems commonsensical that the President can only pardon
offenses already cDmmitted, and many have taken the proposition to be self-
evident.' Yet, this rule does not follow inexorably from the text of the
Constitution, which simply grants the President the power to "grant Reprieves and
Pardons for Offens-,s against the United States,"" without any temporal restriction.
Some have argued that such a rule is necessary to prevent "dispensing with the
53. See Lawrence 13. Walsh, Political Oversight, the Rule of Law, and Iran-Contra, 42 CLEV. ST.
L. RaV. 587, 596 (1994).
54. See, e.g., Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380 (1867) (finding the pardon may be
exercised at any time after commission of offense); Pardoning Power, 11 Op. U.S. Att'y Gen. 227, 229
(1865) ("As a pardon presupposes that an offence has been committed, and ever acts upon the past, the
power to grant it never can be exerted as an immunity or license for future misdoing.").
55. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, ci. 1.
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compulsive effect of statutes, or of the law generally." This is an unconvincing
rationale, however, for the President could just as easily undermine a statute by
pardoning all offenders after the fact as he could by granting pardons before
commission of the offense.' A second possible rationale, offered by Attorney
General Cushing, sounds in the doctrine of separation of powers:
[T]he power of pardoning is granted upon a special confidence that the
administrator of it will spare only those from punishment, whose case,
could it have been foreseen, the legislature may be presumed willing to
have excepted out of the general rules, which the wisdom of man
cannot possibly make so perfect as to suit the particular circumstances
of each special case."
Cushing's argument supposes that the role of determining laws of general
applicability belongs exclusively to the legislature, with the executive pardon power
reserved only for instances unusual enough that the legislature could not have
accounted for them. But this interpretation does not adequately account for the
President's power to grant amnesties, which are essentially grants of pardon to a
broad class of individuals, whose eligibility is determined by general rules, not
specific exceptions. Furthermore, if one accepts that a President is able to discern
after an offense has been committed that a special exception to the laws was
warranted, surely he is equally able to determine in advance that such an exception
will be warranted, if presented with the relevant facts. Circumstances that the
legislature may not have foreseen can arise at any time after a statute is passed; it
does not require actual commission of an offense to perceive that there should be
an exception in a certain case.
A better argument against allowing pre-commission pardons is that it limits
potential abuse by a President to his term in office. If pre-commission pardons were
valid, then an outgoing President - especially one under threat of impeachment or
otherwise leaving in disgrace - could immunize misconduct taking place after he
leaves office. A corrupt President could license his cronies to violate federal laws
for the rest of their lives, while Congress and subsequent Presidents would be
powerless to prevent such corruption.
The Supreme Court has twice stated in dicta that pardons can only be granted for
offenses already committed. The cases are Ex parte Garland" and Ex parte
Grossman,' and neither contains much in the way of elaboration. However, their
56. JOHN POMEROY, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 573 (Edmund H. Bennett ed., Houghton, Mifflin 1886)
(1868); see also W.H. HUMBERT, THE PARDONING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT 63 (1941).
57. See Duker, supra note 3, at 53 (noting Jefferson's use of the pardon toundermine the Alien &
Sedition Act).
58. Passenger Laws - Pardoning Power, 6 Op. Att'y Gen. 393, 403 (1854).
59. Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 380 (stating a pardon may be exercised any time after commission
of offense).
60. Exparte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 121 (1925) ("[A] pardon can only be granted for a [criminal]
contempt fully completed."). More interesting is the debate over whether a pardon can be granted before
conviction. Thirty-eight of the state constitutions explicitly limit the pardon power by providing that it
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interpretation of the pardon power is much in line with English practice at the time
the Constitution was. adopted. At one time, the English king had asserted the
prerogative of granting "promissory pardons," but that practice had ended long
before the framing of the Constitution. 6' A prospective pardon would be analogous
to the medieval English monarch's power of dispensation, whereby the King could
grant an individual permission to disobey a statute.' This power, which had
always been confined to the "laws of man" (mala prohibita, or regulatory laws), as
opposed to the "laws of God" (malum in se, or natural laws), was further restricted
by the English Bill of Rights, which allowed dispensations to be granted only if
specifically authorized by the relevant statute. The framers were well aware of
the lexical distinction between pardon and dispensation, and their failure to include
an executive dispensation power is evidence that they did not intend the pardon
power to operate in this manner. Based on this history, as well as the need to limit
possible presidential abuse and the lack of a single instance of a pre-commission
pardon in the United States, it may be regarded as settled that pardons can only be
granted after commission of an offense.
The consequences of this limitation hamper the President's ability to impede
investigations, since the pardon of any offense does not encompass any subsequent
commission of peijury or contempt. Suppose, for example, that a U.S. Army officer
sells arms in violation of an act of Congress, and is subsequently pardoned for this
offense. If he is then called to testify by a grand jury regarding his activities, any
perjury or contempt that he may commit in the course of testifying would fall
outside the scope of the pardon, having been committed subsequent to the pardon
itself.
To truly complete the coverup, the President could always grant a second pardon.
Successively issued pardons could effectively counter repeated perjury convictions
or criminal contempt citations so long as the President remains in office. But by
forcing him to make a series of pardons to protect his witness, the bar against pre-
commission pardons compels the President to make his motivations explicit.
Consider the Iran-Contra affair; President Bush justified the pardons primarily on
the grounds that the officials had acted with "honor, decency, and fairness," that
they had distinguished records of service, that they did not profit personally by their
actions, and that they were being punished for policy differences within the
may only be used after conviction. See 3 U.S. DEPCr OF JUSTICE, ATrORNEY GENERAL'S SURVEY OF
RELEASE PROCEDURES: PARDON 142-43 (1939) [hereinafter SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES:
PARDON]. While pre-conviction pardons are rare, their acceptability is implied in both Grossman and
Garland. Notwithstanding, Philip Kurland suggested that Ford's pardon of Nixon was invalid because
it was granted before ecnviction. See Philip Kurland, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 13, 1974, at 1. For a
comprehensive discussion of the issue, concluding that pre-conviction pardons are permissible, see
Macgill, supra note 16, at 64-74.
61. POMEROY, supra note 56, at 573; SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES: PARDON, supra note 60,
at 143.
62. See 6 SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF LAWS OF ENGLAND 217-18 (1924) (2d cd.
1936).
63. Id. at 240-41.
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administration." None of these reasons, even if they justified pardon for the
underlying offenses, could plausibly justify a second or successive pardon for
perjury or contempt. In such a case, the President's objective to conceal information
would be demonstrated unequivocally by the second pardon. The perceived
illegitimacy of a pardon for perjury in a political case such as the Iran-Contra affair
would only be amplified if the President had to issue a consecutive series of
pardons for perjury. The flagrant use of the pardon power to conceal information,
without any plausible alternative justification, would likely provoke calls for
impeachment, and would probably irreparably injure any prospects for reelection.'
Even in the case of successive pardons, a President can only protect a witness
while he holds office. The ban against pre-commission pardons ensures that a
President will not be able to hinder an investigation that takes place after he has left
office. Thus, even without any of the other checks discussed in this piece, the worst
a President could accomplish without the active assistance of his successors in
office would be to delay an investigation for several years. The exclusively
retroactive nature of the pardon power thus limits a President to acting within his
own term, and by forcing him to grant consecutive pardons to shield ongoing
instances of perjury or contempt, compels him to reveal his true motivations to
conceal information.
B. Civil Contempt Is Not a Pardonable Offense
Although a pardon blocks criminal prosecution of a witness to presidential
misconduct, the possibility of calling the witness to testify in another's criminal trial
or before a grand jury to determine whether others should be indicted remains a
viable means of extracting information. Furthermore, where the circumstances are
such that a private party is able to assert a civil cause of action (as in the Paula
Jones case), the full coercive power of the courts stands behind the private litigant
to force witnesses with relevant knowledge to cooperate. If a person refuses to
testify or cooperate in discovery, she can, of course, be held in contempt of court."
Because civil contempt of court are not pardonable offenses under current
constitutional doctrine, there is little a President can do to interfere with the process
of discovery and the taking of testimony either in civil cases or before a grand jury.
Courts generally draw a distinction in purpose and effect between criminal and
civil contempts. The distinction has nothing to do with whether the case itself is
64. Jorgensen, supra note 29, at 362-65.
65. See Kobil, supra note 18, at 598 n.182 (arguing a President runs the risk of impeachment for
obstructionist use of the pardon power).
66. See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 37(b)(1) (providing failure to be sworn or to answer questions in a
deposition after being so directed by a court may be considered contempt); FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(D)
(allowing the court to treat as contempt any failure to obey certain disclosure or discovery orders).
Section 17 of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 granted federal courts broad statutory powers of
contempt, Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 83 (1789), although
the Supreme Court has held that this provision merely restates what would have been within the power
of the courts in any event. The power of contempt is inherent in the judiciary and requires no specific
authorization. See Er parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1873).
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criminal or civil; rather, it relates to the function of the contempt citation itself and
the type of sanction imposed. The Supreme Court articulated the core difference in
Gompers v. Bucks Stove and Range Co.:67
It is not the fact of punishment, but rather its character and purpose,
that often serve to distinguish between the two classes of cases. If it is
for civil contempt the punishment is remedial, and for the benefit of the
complainant. But if it is for criminal the sentence is punitive, to
vindicate the authority of the court."
Thus, a civil contempt is coercive, designed to force the offender to comply with
a court order, whereas a criminal contempt is strictly punitive in nature.' An
indeterminate penalty, such as imprisonment or a daily fine until compliance is
obtained, is indicative of a civil contempt. The civil contemnor, it is said, "carries
the keys of his prison in his own pocket."7 The typical punishment for criminal
contempt, conversely, is a determinate sentence of imprisonment or a fine. As an
alternate characterization, the Gompers Court also drew a distinction between
"refusing to do an act commanded," which constitutes a civil contempt, and "doing
an act forbidden," which constitutes a criminal contempt'
The difference between civil and criminal contempt is sometimes obscure and has
been widely criticized in academic literature.' To begin with, most findings of
contempt combine coercive and punitive goals. As the Court in Gompers conceded:
[I]f the case is civil and the punishment is purely remedial, there is also
a vindication of the court's authority. On the other hand, if the
proceeding is for criminal contempt and the imprisonment is solely
punitive, to vindicate the authority of the law, the complainant may also
derive some incidental benefit from the fact that such punishment tends
to prevent a repetition of the disobedience.'
The Court nevertheless defends the distinction by trying to identify the primary
function of a particular contempt citation. However, as Phillip Hostak has noted in
his critique of contempt doctrine, identification of the "primary" function of an order
which has both coercive and punitive qualities takes on a certain a priori charac-
ter. 4 Nevertheless, courts have thus far adhered to the basic Gompers framework. 5
67. 221 U.S. 418 (1911).
68. Gompers, 221 U.S. at 441.
69. See C.H. THOMts, PROBLEMS OF CONTEMPr OF COURT 2 (1934).
70. In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 461 (8th Cir. 1902).
71. Gompers, 221 U.S. at 443.
72. For a particularly thorough critique, see Philip Hostak, Note, International Union, United Mine
Workers v. Bagwell: A Paradigm Shift in the Distinction Between Civil and Criminal Contempt, 81
CORNELL L. Rv. 181 (1995). See also Joseph Moskovitz, Contemptof Injunctions, Civil and Criminal,
43 COLUM. L. Rev. 780 (1943).
73. Gompers, 221 U.S. at 443.
74. See Hostak, supra note 72, at 199-200.
75. See, e.g., Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 372 (1966) (finding a two-year prison term
for refusal to answer questions posed by grand jury to be civil contempt, where contemnor could relieve
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Turning now to the question of pardons, the United States Supreme Court held
in Grossman that a President's pardon power extended to criminal contempt, but
strongly suggested in dicta that it did not encompass civil contempt.76 In finding
that criminal contempt is a pardonable offense, the Court drew upon English
common law at the time of the framing of the Constitution." Reasoning that the
English monarch's pardon power extended to criminal contempt, the Court found
that a similar construction must be given to the Constitution's grant of pardon power
to the President. 8 In so doing, the Court rejected the argument that separation of
powers prohibited executive interference in a court's enforcement of its orders
through contempt, and that allowing pardons would be too great a usurpation of the
judiciary's authority. Chief Justice Taft was dismissive of this objection:
If it be said that the President, by successive pardons of constantly
recurring contempt in particular litigation, might deprive a court of
power to enforce its orders in a recalcitrant neighborhood, it is enough
to observe that such a course is so improbable as to furnish but little
basis for argument. Exceptional cases like this, if to be imagined at all,
would suggest a resort to impeachment rather than to a narrow and
strained construction of the general powers of the President.8
In addition to pointing out the possibility of impeachment, Taft argued that
judicial abuse of the contempt power was a more serious concern than executive
abuse of the pardon power, since many of the protections of the Bill of Rights,
including the right to a jury trial, did not apply to contempt proceedings at that
time."°
The Grossman decision has hardly escaped criticism."' But whatever one's view
of the holding on criminal contempt, the Court was on firm ground when it stated
in dicta that, "[for civil contempt the punishment is remedial and for the benefit of
himself of punishment by agreeing to testify); In re Borough of West Wildwood, 42 NJ. Super. 282,285
(1956) (utilizing the Gompers test to distinguish between daily fines against a borough for violating an
injunction as civil contempt and one-time fines against particular officials as criminal contempt); cf.
International Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 833-34 (1994) (adhering to civil-
criminal distinction for contempts and finding out-of-court violations of complex injunctions are criminal
contempts because the complex evidentiary questions posed by such cases necessitate criminal procedure-
type protections).
76. See Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 121 (1925).
77. See id. at 108-09.
78. See id. at 109-13.
79. Id. at 121,
80. See id. at 122. Today, most criminal procedural safeguards do apply to contempt proceedings,
although the right to indictment by a grand jury still does not apply, and the right against double
jeopardy has been held not to bar an action for criminal contempt notwithstanding prior proceedings for
civil contempt. See Hostak, supra note 72, at 185.
81. The most persuasive contemporary critique is offered by Rice Larder, Executive Pardon for
Contempt of Court, 2 ROCKY MTN. L REV. 137, 151 (1930). C.H. Thomas provides a defense of the
holding on the ground that pardon is necessary to curb excesses of the judiciary. See THOMAS, supra note
69, at 92-93.
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the complainant, md a pardon cannot stop it."' Again, common law history
supports this assertion, since the English King could not pardon civil contempt at
the time of the framing of the Constitution.' The basis for both the English rule
and its continued practice in America is that allowing a pardon for civil contempt
would interfere with the civil litigation process to such an extent as to deprive a
litigant of the legal right being asserted in the suit.
The principle that a pardon cannot compromise interests or rights which have
vested in a third party is widely accepted. As early as the thirteenth century,
Bracton commented on the King's prerogative of "inlawry," or restoring the
protections of the law to one who had been "outlawed," that
[t]he King cannot grant grace if it is to the harm and damage of
others. He may give what is his own, that is his peace, which the
outlaw lost by his flight and his contumacy, but by his grace he cannot
give what belongs to another."
This basic premise was followed in American practice. By its terms, the pardon
power is limited to "offenses against the United States."85 This clearly excludes
pardoning defendants in civil suits between private parties in which the United
States has no interest.' In a similar vein, even a pardon granted for an offense
against the United States will not have the effect of restoring rights or property
which have already vested in a third party. For example, in Knote v. United
States," the Court ruled that a pardon did not restore property which had been
confiscated and sold during the Civil War.' The Court stated:
Neither does the pardon affect any rights which have vested in others
directly by the execution of the judgment for the offense, or which have
been acquiredl by others whilst that judgment was in force. If, for
example, by the judgment a sale of the offender's property has been
had, the purchaser will hold the property notwithstanding the subsequent
pardon."
82. Grossman, 267 U.S. at 111.
83. The Attorney General's argument in Grossman suggested that the King could at one time pardon
civil contempts, but by the time of the framing of the Constitution this was no longer the case, citing a
number of cases as well as Blackstone for the proposition that a pardon cannot infringe upon the rights
of others. See id. at 103.
84. 2 HENRY DE ERACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 373 (George Edward
Woodbine ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1968) (1883).
85. U.S. CONST. a=t. II, § 2.
86. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Ferguson, 60 N.E. 679 (Ind. 1901); HUMBERT, supra note 56,
at 54. The President may only remit criminal fines or forfeitures pursuant to the pardon power if they
accrue to the United States, but not if they are directed to a third party (typically the victim, captor, or
prize crew). See Oshom v. United States, 91 U.S. 474, 476 (1875); Pardoning Power of the President,
16 Op. Att'y Gen. 1 (1878); Effect of Pardons, 8 Op. Att'y Gen. 281 (1857); Pardon - Restitution of
Fine, 5 Op. Att'y Gen. 532 (1852).
87. 95 U.S. 149 (1877).
88. Id. at 154-55.
89. Id at 154.
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So, the Grossman Court's statement that a pardon cannot "interfere with the use
of coercive measures to enforce a suitor's right" seems correct." The same
conclusion has been reached by all state courts that have considered the matter,9'
and is universally accepted in academic literature.'
In light of these precedents, it is apparent that the President could not pardon a
recalcitrant witness who, refusing to testify or to turn over certain documents, is
found in contempt of court. If the contempt is civil in nature, as surely it would
be, '3 with an indeterminate penalty designed to force compliance with the court's
order, then a pardon would be of no use to the contemnor. Even if the contempt is
criminal, and a President grants a pardon, double jeopardy does not bar a
subsequent citation for civil contempt. Thus, ultimate coercive power. to obtain
testimony remains with the courts.'
It might be argued that a recalcitrant witness, informed by clever legal counsel,
would actively perjure herself or destroy documents, rather than just refuse to testify
or cooperate. Subsequent perjury or obstruction of justice charges, as statutory
federal crimes, would clearly be pardonable offenses. Still, a contempt citation
might follow in addition to the perjury charges. Although perjury is not necessarily
an act for which one can be held in contempt, if the perjury tends to obstruct the
proper functioning of the court - as it almost always will - then a contempt
citation is proper.95 In any case, it is easier to publicly justify refusal to cooperate
with an investigation than to justify actively lying under oath. Furthermore, the
necessity of issuing successive pardons to protect a witness who successively
perjures herself makes this hypothetical politically highly improbable.'
The threat of contempt will not, of course, always guarantee forthright, truthful
answers. Some witnesses will opt to suffer the penalties of contempt, or gamble that
the opposing party will be unable to expose their evasiveness or perjury. But the
point is that a President's pardon power has little impact on a witness' decision-
90. Grossman, 267 U.S. at 121.
91. See People v. Peters, 137 N.E. 118 (Il. 1922); State v. Verage, 187 N.W. 830 (Wis. 1922);
Hutton v. McCleskey, 200 S.W. 1032 (Ark. 1918); Ex parte Brown, 2 Colo. 553 (1875).
92. See, e.g., SURvEY OF RELEAsE PRocEDURES: PARDON, supra note 60, at 140; HUMBERT, supra
note 56, at 61; THOMAS, supra note 69, at 76; Lawrence N. Gray, Contempt!, 69 N.Y. ST. B.J. 22, 25
(1997).
93. See Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966). Interesting in this respect is Judge Susan
Webber Wright's recent holding of President Clinton in civil contempt of court for his evasive testimony
during the Paula Jones case. Jones v. Clinton, 36 F. Supp. 2d I I18 (E.D. Ark. 1999) (No. LR-C-94-290)
available in 1999 WL 202909. Even if presidential self-pardons are constitutionally permissible - a
dubious proposition, see Brian Knit, Pardon Me?: The Constitutional Case Against Presidential Self-
Pardons, 106 YALE L.J. 779,798-99 (1996) - Clinton would be barred from pardoning himself for this
contempt citation by virtue of its remedial function as a civil contempt. See Jones, 1999 WL 202909,
at *14-*15.
94. See Hostak, supra note 72, at 185.
95. See Exparte Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378,383 (1919) (finding perjury punishable as contempt only
when it obstructs the functioning of the court); Stephen L. Braga, "OfAll Liars, the Smoothest and Most
Convincing Is Memory": A Critique of the Application of the Recalcitrant Witness Statute to the
Nonrecalling Witness, 21 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 425,442-43 (1984).
96. See supra notes 54-65 and accompanying text.
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making calculus when called to testify before a grand jury or in an associated
criminal or civil trial. Whether or not any underlying offense has been pardoned,
the witness remains compelled to answer questions in all of these settings, a
compulsion that is not removed by the pardon power.
C. Contempt of Congress Is Probably Not a Pardonable Offense
In order to make intelligent, informed legislative choices, Congress must have
access to information. Usually, witnesses are forthcoming with testimony before
Congress. For a variety of reasons, however, some witnesses may refuse to provide
information that Congress deems essential to reaching an informed decision. In
these instances, it is vital that Congress have the ability to compel testimony if it
is to successfully fulfill its constitutionally assigned responsibilities. Following this
lpgic, the Supreme Court has found that the power to compel attendance and
testimony, and to punish violations of its orders, are inherent powers of Congress.'
If the contempt power is an essential foundation for the exercise of all of
Congress' other powers, then it would be troubling to discover that a President could
interfere with this power through exercise of the pardon. If perjury before Congress
and contempt of Congress are pardonable offenses, then it is the President, not
Congress, who ultimately determines who can be compelled to give congressional
testimony. The balance of powers between the executive and legislative branches
would be upset if the President has control over Congress' access to information in
this way. Joseph Story adopted this line of reasoning in arguing against the
constitutionality of pardons for legislative contempt:
It would seem to result from the principle, on which the power of
each branch of the legislature to punish for contempts is founded, that
the executive authority cannot interpose between them and the offender.
The main object is to secure a purity, independence, and ability of the
legislature adequate to the discharge of all their duties. If they can be
overawed by force, or corrupted by largesses, or interrupted in their
proceedings by violence, without the means of self-protection, it is
obvious, that they will soon be found incapable of legislating with
wisdom or independence. If the executive should possess the power of
pardoning any such offender, they would be wholly dependent upon his
good will and pleasure for the exercise of their own powers. Thus, in
effect, the rights of the people entrusted to them would be placed in
perpetual jeopardy. The constitution is silent in respect to the right of
granting pardons in such cases, as it is in respect to the jurisdiction to
97. See Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179, 183 (1954); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135
(1927); Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821). In the early nineteenth century, compliance
with an order compelling attendance was secured by an officer of Congress itself, as shown by the
Anderson case. Today, as a practical matter, Congress has delegated enforcement of its contempt power
to the other two branches by codifying contempt as a statutory misdemeanor. See 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1994).
That is, contemnors against Congress are prosecuted by the executive branch before judges of the judicial
branch.
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punish for contempts. The latter arises by implication; and to make it
effectual the former is excluded by implication."
Story's argument is powerful, and some early Attorney General opinions follow his
reasoning in suggesting that contempt of Congress is an implied exception to the
pardoning power."
There have been no federal or state court cases directly considering whether
legislative contempt is a pardonable offense. In the case of The Laura, the Supreme
Court hinted that the pardon power does not extend to "fines ... imposed by a co-
ordinate department of the government for contempt of its authority."'" However,
the decision in Grossman, finding criminal contempt to be a pardonable offense,
seems to override The Laura on this point and poses some problems for Story's
argument.'' One of the factors that weighed in the Grossman Court's opinion was
the long-standing practice of granting pardons for judicial contempt, with no
executive abuse sufficient to provoke a judicial challenge.'" Nothing approaching
this level of precedent exists with respect to legislative contempts. At the federal
level, there has apparently been only one instance of a pardon for contempt of
Congress, granted to Dr. Francis Townsend in 1938.03 This single case, apparently
uncontested in the courts, hardly establishes a pattern or practice of constitutional
dimensions.
More problematic is the Grossman Court's rejection of the balance of powers
argument that pardon for contempt of court would tend to destroy the independence
of the judiciary.'" Addressing this holding, several commentators have argued that
pardons for contempt of Congress must therefore also be permissible. A pardon for
legislative contempt is no more violative of separation of powers, the argument
goes, than is a pardon for judicial contempt." In a further analogy to Grossman,
W.H. Humbert posits, "would not a contempt of Congress appear to be as much an
98. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 353 (Fred
B. Rothman & Co. ed., 1991) (1833).
99. See Power of the President to Remit Fines Against Defaulting Jurors, 4 Op. Att'y Gen. 458,
460-61 (1845) (citing Rawle and Story); Courts-Martial, 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 286, 289 (1829) (suggesting
a possible exception to pardoning power for contempts of Congress).
100. The Laura, 114 US. 411,413 (1885).
101. See supra notes 76, 101-80 and accompanying text.
102. See Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 122 (1925).
103. See SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES: PARDON, supra note 60, at 141. Dr. Townsend was
the leader of a popular movement to establish a flat-rate monthly payment to all persons over the age
of 65. His petitions garnered millions of signatures and ultimately contributed to the establishment of
social security. In 1938, he was called to testify before a congressional investigating committee on aging.
After several days of testimony, during which he was asked some peculiar questions, including whether
he encouraged the sentiment that he was the embodiment of Jesus Christ and whether he knew that an
associate of his was accused of having kissed an Indian squaw in public (!), Townsend refused to answer
any further questions and walked out on the committee. He was found in contempt for this refusal to
testify. See generally Townsend v. United States, 95 F.2d 352 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
104. See supra notes 76, 101-80 and accompanying text.
105. See SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES: PARDON, supra note 60, at 140-41; HUMBERT, supra
note 56, at 61.
1999]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1999
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
offense against ihe United States as a criminal contempt of Court?'1'1 More
recently, William Duker somewhat regretfully acknowledges that Grossman
inescapably leads to the conclusion that contempt of Congress is pardonable."°e
There are, however, good reasons for distinguishing Grossman from the case of
legislative contempt. Through means of impeachment, Congress exercises a direct
check on presidential power that is absent from the powers of the judicial branch.
Balance of powers concerns are therefore greater when a President intrudes upon
the inherent powers of Congress. Impeachment is Congress' final trump card; it is
the only constitutional check on the pardon power, the only means through which
a President who has abused the pardon power may be removed.'" If impeachment
is to be a meaningful option in times of crisis, Congress must have the ability to
investigate and, if necessary, coerce testimony from witnesses. If the sole witnesses
to presidential misconduct are his accomplices, then Congress may have no way of
determining whether an impeachable offense has been committed if the President
pardons those who refuse to testify. Thus, allowing pardons for contempt of
Congress could subvert the ultimate check on the executive. This is a more serious
concern than possible intrusion upon the independence of the judiciary through
pardon of judicial contempts, which, after all, could also be remedied by impeach-
ment.
In textual term!;, to satisfy Humbert's argument about the definition of "offenses
against the United States," the exception for legislative contempt can be read into
the impeachment exception in the Pardon Clause." Article II, section 2, which
excepts "Cases of Impeachment" from the pardoning power, should not be narrowly
construed as limited strictly to offenses leading to impeachment."' It is better
interpreted as preventing executive interference with impeachment proceedings. The
exception applies equally to the actual impeachment determination as to the case of
a pardon granted for contempt or perjury committed in the course of an impeach-
ment proceeding. The Constitution allows a President to grant pardons "except in
Cases of Impeachment,""' and here the preposition "in" is all-important. A pardon
granted to a contemnor against Congress might not be for the impeachable offense,
but nevertheless would occur in a case of impeachment, if the contempt was
committed during the course of impeachment proceedings. Thus, from a textual
perspective, the Constitution appears to bar not only pardons for impeached officials
themselves, but also for any witnesses called to testify during the impeachment
proceedings.
The purpose behind the impeachment exception supports such a construction of
the pardon clause. In The Federalist No. 69, Alexander Hamilton explained that the
exception was to discourage official misconduct at the highest levels:
106. HUMBERT, supra note 56, at 61-62.
107. See Duker, .rupra note 3, at 529.
108. See infra notes 140-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of abuse of the pardoning
power as an impeaehr.ble offense.
109. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2.
110. d.
111. Id.
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Would not the prospect of a total indemnity for all the preliminary
steps be a greater temptation to undertake and persevere in an enterprise
against the public liberty, than the mere prospect of an exemption from
death and confiscation, if the final execution of the design, upon an
actual appeal to arms, should miscarry? Would this last expectation
have any influence at all, when the probability was computed that the
person who was to afford that exemption might himself be involved in
the consequences of the measure, and might be incapacitated by his
agency in it from affording the desired impunity?"'
In other words, the impeachment exception inhibits misconduct in two ways.
First, it allows Congress to impeach the official directly. Second, it decreases the
chance that a President will be able to grant pardons to his accomplices, since he
may himself be impeached as a consequence of his participation in the wrongdoing,
and will be powerless to prevent his own removal from office. Clearly, both of
these disincentives would be undermined if a President could obscure relevant
information by pardoning all those held in contempt of Congress for refusing to
testify. For this reason, the courts would be fully justified in distinguishing
Grossman and finding that legislative contempt fall outside of the pardoning power.
The same arguments apply to perjury before Congress.
It should be noted here that this argument applies only to contempt committed
against the House of Representatives, since the House has the sole power to
impeach."' The House must have the ability to fully inform itself in order to
ascertain whether impeachment is justified. Therefore, all testimony before the
House should be unprotected by the pardon power. With respect to the Senate, the
bar against pardoning legislative contempt would probably apply only to contempt
committed in the course of the actual trial following impeachment."4
If one accepts this reasoning, then a President has no power to prevent the House
from coercing testimony, even from someone who has received a presidential
pardon. The only restriction on the House is that the questions posed be related to
a topic within the legislative competence of Congress."' This is a weak restriction;
Congress deals with a great many subjects, and the breadth of testimony taken
before Congress is correspondingly wide. In most cases where there would be a
danger of a President using a pardon to cover up information, compelling testimony
before the House from the witness would be amply justified on the grounds of
investigating whether to begin impeachment proceedings. This is true even after a
112. THE FEDERAUST No. 69, at 419 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
113. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5.
114. For a similar differentiation between the House and Senate, see Akhil Amar, Some Opinions
on the Opinions Clause, 82 VA. L. REv. 647, 660 (1996).
115. See Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 190 (1880) ("[Wle are sure that no person can be
punished for contumacy as a witness before either House, unless his testimony is required in a matter
into which that House has jurisdiction to inquire, and we feel equally sure that neither of these bodies
possesses the general power of making inquiry into the private affairs of the citizen.").
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President has left office, for impeachment could still be pursued in order to strip
him of his pension and entitlements."'
D. A Pardon Remits Only Punishment for an Offense, Not Any Other
Consequences of the Offense
Courts have been more willing to restrict the effects of a pardon than they have
to limit the instances in which the executive may exercise the power. The
nineteenth-century view that a pardon "blots out of existence the guilt" of the
offender has been replaced by a rough consensus that a pardon only remits
punishment for an offense. Numerous effects of guilt, ranging from disbarment,
harsher sentencing for subsequent offenses, and existence of a criminal record, have
been sustained notwithstanding a pardon.
In United States v. Wilson,"7 the first case relating to the effects of a pardon,
Chief Justice Marshall stated that a pardon "exempts the individual, on whom it is
bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed.",
' M
This formulation, limiting the scope of a pardon to punishment, was significantly
broadened in the Reconstruction era. As Congress sought to impose various
sanctions on those who had supported the Confederacy, despite President Johnson's
amnesty of most Confederate sympathizers, the Court was directly confronted with
the question of the pardon power's scope. In Ex parte Garland, the Court gave an
expansive interpretation to the President's power:
A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and
the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the
punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the
law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the
offense. If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties
and disabilities consequent upon conviction from attaching; if granted
after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores
him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and
gives him a new credit and capacity."'
In contrast to Chief Justice Marshall's limited language about the punishment for
an offense, the Garland Court speaks not only of "penalties," but also of
"disabilities;" not only of mitigating punishment, but disposing of the underlying
guilt altogether. The line drawn here is not whether an effect is punitive in nature,
but simply whether it stems from guilt or conviction of the crime. Under this view,
the pardon establi;hes the "factual" innocence of the offender as well as his "legal"
innocence.
116. Although rare, post-resignation impeachments are not unknown. In 1876, Secretary of War
William Belknap was impeached - though not convicted - following his resignation. See Boudin,
supra note 4, at 36 n.184.
117. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150 (1833).
118. Id. at 160 (emphasis added).
119. Ex parte Galand, 71 U.S. 333, 380-81 (1866).
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This definition of pardon leads to some odd results. For example, suppose a
surgeon operates while inebriated. The patient dies, and the surgeon is convicted of
manslaughter, but subsequently pardoned. According to Garland, any and all
disabilities flowing from conviction are removed: not only is his punishment
remitted, but he must be treated as if he factually had never committed the crime.
Presumably, the surgeon could not be deprived of his license and thus prevented
from operating in the future." Professor Samuel Williston rejected the notion that
these bizarre effects flow from a pardon in his seminal article, "Does a Pardon Blot
out Guilt?""'' After careful review of English and American case law on the
subject, Williston criticized Garland and concluded that
[t]he true line of distinction seems to be this: The pardon removes all
legal punishment for the offense. Therefore, if the mere conviction
involves certain disqualifications which would not follow from the
commission of the crime without conviction, the pardon removes such
disqualifications. On the other hand, if character is a necessary
qualification and the commission of a crime would disqualify even
though there had been no criminal prosecution for the crime, the fact
that the criminal has been convicted and pardoned does not make him
any more eligible.'"
Williston's article has been influential, and his distinction between punishment
and nonpunitive qualifications has been widely adopted. Most subsequent cases in
federal as well as state courts follow his reasoning, many of them citing directly to
the article."
120. See In re Abrams, 689 A.2d 6, 10-11 (D.C.) (en banc), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2515 (1997).
121. Samuel Williston, Does a Pardon Blot out Guilt?, 28 HARv. L. REV. 647 (1915).
122. Id. at 653. Williston's thesis, it should be observed, is not without its vagaries. He articulates
at least two possible theories for the effect of a pardon. First, he asserts that pardon removes the "legal
punishment for the offense." This is identical to the Wilson formulation. Second, he posits that pardon
removes all consequences of conviction, but not consequences that would have attached to the conduct
even without conviction. It is apparent that these are not the same thing; the second formulation is
considerably broader. Not all consequences of conviction are necessarily punitive. The first test would
bar only punitive consequences of conviction, while the second would bar both punitive and nonpunitive
consequences.
An example will illustrate the differences between the two theories. In Carlesi v. New York, the
Supreme Court held that consideration of a pardoned offense was permissible in determining the sentence
for a later offense. Carlesi v. New York, 233 U.S. 51 (1914). The Court reasoned that the additional
punishment imposed because the offender was a "habitual criminal" was not punishment for the first
offense. Instead, the Court found that the first offense was simply evidence of the offender's status as
a habitual criminal, which warranted a more severe sentence. The Court concluded that the more severe
sentence was in no way punitive with respect to the first, pardoned offense. Yet, plainly it would not
have been imposed but for conviction of the first offense. The additional punishment was therefot'e a
nonpunitive consequence of having committed the first offense, and a punitive consequence of having
committed the second. Similarly, the existence of a criminal record is not intended to be punitive, but
will not come about except upon conviction for a criminal offense. The blurring of these two ideas
continues to the present day, as demonstrated by the conceptual confusion in the Abrams case. See infra
notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
123. See, e.g., United States v. Noonan, 906 F.2d 952, 958-59 (3d Cir. 1990); Bjerkan v. United
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The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia recently addressed the issue
of whether an attorney could be suspended from practice for perjuring himself
before Congress, notwithstanding a subsequent pardon. The case, In re Abrans,
dealt with one of President Bush's Iran-Contra pardons." Elliott Abrams had been
convicted of perjuring himself before three congressional committees relating to the
Iran-Contra affair, but was subsequently granted a full and unconditional pardon."
Despite the pardon, Abrams was suspended from the practice of law for one year
for his misrepresentations to Congress. Citing Garland, Abrams argued that the
pardon established his factual innocence, thus eliminating any legal basis for his
suspension from practice. The court decisively rejected Abrams' contention, holding
that the pardon "could not and did not require the court to close its eyes to the fact
that Abrams did what he did."'2
The majority opinion characterized the suspension as the enforcement of moral
qualifications for bar membership, rather than as punishment for Abrams'
misconduct. The Abrams court found that its "purpose in conducting disciplinary
proceedings and imposing sanctions is not to punish the attorney; rather, it is to
offer the desired protection by assuring the continued or restored fitness of an
attorney to practice law."'2 Because the pardon could not "reinvest [Abrams] with
those qualities which are absolutely essential for an attorney at law to possess," the
suspension was beyond the reach of a pardon." The court also argued, somewhat
inconsistently, that the pardon does not affect disciplinary proceedings because they
are not a consequence of conviction. Since a local or state bar association could
"independently determine] that the underlying conduct, or some portion of it,
violated one of its canons of ethics," the sanction did not follow from conviction,
but attached to the underlying misconduct directly.'" Thus, the court found the
sanction of suspension beyond the reach of a pardon both because it was non-
punitive and because it was not solely a consequence of conviction.
States, 529 F.2d 125, 128 n.2 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1022 (1973).
124. Abrams, 689 A.2d at 10-11.
125. See id.. In light of the conclusion reached in supra Part 11.3 that contempt and perjury before
the House are not pardenable offenses, the validity of Abrams' pardon is questionable. While this issue
was not raised in the case, it is arguable that the pardon for pejury interfered with Congress' ability to
gather information wh ch may have led to President Bush's impeachment, and thus violated the
impeachment exception to the pardon power.
126. Id. at 7.
127. Id. at 12 (citing In re Steele, 630 A.2d 196, 200 (D.C. 1993)).
128. Abrams, 689 A.2d at 7 (citing In re Lavine, 41 P.2d 161, 163 (Cal. 1935)). While the court
held that the pardon dil not remove the basis for imposing disciplinary sanctions for the underlying
misconduct, a majority of the court did not concur in the severity of the sanction, and Abrams was
ultimately publicly censured, not suspended from practice. See id. at 24-25.
129. Id. at 16. While conviction of a crime of sufficient seriousness often constitutes a per se
violation of bar codes of ethics, see, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr Rule 8.4(b) (1995)
(classifying as professic nal misconduct the commission of a criminal act that "reflects adversely on the
lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects"), conviction is not usually a
prerequisite for disciplirary action. Codes of professional conduct often penalize conduct that is not itself
criminal.
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The holding in Abrams is adequately grounded in Supreme Court precedent. In
Carlesi v. New York,' the Court held that a court may take into account a prior
offense when sentencing a criminal, even if that offense had been pardoned.'
Although the more severe sentence was plainly a consequence of conviction for the
pardoned offense, the Court nevertheless held that the additional increment of
punishment was not punitive with respect to the first offense, but merely reflected
a state judgment that the offender was deserving of a harsher penalty for the second
offense.' More recently, in Nixon v. United States,' the Court found that "the
granting of a pardon is in no sense an overturning of a judgment of conviction by
some other tribunal; it is an executive action that mitigates or sets aside punishment
for a crime.""j3 Viewed together, Carlesi and Nixon represent the Supreme Court's
return to its original, more limited understanding of the effects of a pardon set forth
by Chief Justice Marshall in Wilson.
A person who perjures himself before a grand jury or before Congress, confident
he will receive a pardon, must therefore contend with the fact that not all
consequences of his crime will be extinguished by the pardon. In fact, there are
many harmful effects. As Elliott Abrams found out, an attorney could be disbarred
or otherwise sanctioned by a bar association.35 Disqualification from other
occupations by state licensing agencies is also possible." The existence of a
criminal record documenting one's conviction is not expunged by a pardon.'37
Following from that, evidence of one's criminal history would probably be
admissible for the purposes of impeachment of testimony under the Federal Rules
of Evidence.' Furthermore, as a convicted criminal, the offender would in some
cases be subject to more severe punishment under recidivist statutes, and the
conviction could count as a "strike" for the purposes of "three-strikes-and-you're-
out" laws.' In addition, the offender may be ineligible for military service."
130. 233 U.S. 51 (1914).
131. ld. at 59.
132. See id at 57-59.
133. 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
134. Id. at 232 (citing BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1113 (6th ed. 1990)) (emphasis added). The case
bears no relation to former President Nixon, but rather to a chief judge of a federal district court who
unsuccessfully challenged the procedure by which he was impeached by Congress.
135. In addition to Abrams, a number of state courts have also come to this conclusion. See, e.g.,
In re Lavine, 41 P.2d 161 (Cal. 1935); Nelson v. Commonwealth, 109 S.W. 337 (Ky. 1908); In re
Bozarth, 63 P.2d 726 (Okla. 1936).
136. See Bjerkan v. United States, 529 F.2d 125, 129 (7th Cir. 1975) (Fairchild, J., dissenting).
137. See United States v. Noonan, 906 F.2d 952, 960 (3d Cir. 1990).
138. See Bjerkan, 529 F.2d at 129; cf. Boyd v. United States, 142 U.S. 450 (1892) (holding pardon
restored competency to testify). The distinction here is that, while pardon restores competency to testify,
evidence of prior convictions could still be used to impeach the credibility of the witness, despite the fact
of a pardon for those offenses.
139. See Carlesi v. New York, 233 U.S. 51 (1914) (upholding the sentencing of a defendant as a
second offender, notwithstanding that he had been pardoned for the first offense).
140. See Effect of Pardon on Statute Making Persons Convicted of Felonies Ineligible for Enlistment
in the Army, 39 Op. Att'y Gen. 132 (1938); Army - Enlistment - Pardon, 22 Op. Att'y Gen. 36, 37
(1898).
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In sum, any sanction by the state that could be characterized as regulatory rather
than punitive will be unaffected by the pardon.
The threat of these negative consequences may be insufficient to prevent an
official from perjuring himself at the President's behest. But again, the same could
be said of contempt or any criminal penalty imposed for perjury. What is important
is that a pardon does not place a perjurer in the same position he would have been
in had he never committed the crime. In that the residual consequences of
conviction are serious disabilities, even if they are not styled "punitive" in nature,
potential perjurers may be dissuaded from committing crimes to conceal information
even in the expectation of a pardon.
E. Political Checks of Electoral Accountability and Impeachment Discourage
Abuse of Executive Clemency
From a public relations perspective, the coverup is often worse than the scandal.
A President seeking reelection has a strong disincentive to grant pardons that would
be perceived as attempts to hide information. Even second-term Presidents, though
no longer directly ccountable through the electoral process, want to maintain high
approval ratings andJ set the stage for election of their chosen successor. The power
of history should also not be discounted: which President wants to go down in the
history books as the one who abused the pardon power for personal gain? These
mechanisms will not always ensure accountability, of course. It is worth noting that
President Ford may have cost himself the 1976 election by pardoning Nixon, 4'
and he did it nevertheless.
Impeachment is a more substantial check on presidential abuse of executive
clemency. Chief Jurstice Taft relied on impeachment as the appropriate remedy for
gross abuses of the pardon power.' There are at least two instances of state
governors being impeached for such corruption. Texas Governor James E. "Pa"
Ferguson was impeached in 1917 following a pardon-selling scandal. 4' J.C.
Walton, governor of Oklahoma, was impeached in 1923 following numerous
pardons of politica allies, often for cash.'"
An outgoing President may have greater temptation to abuse the power - as
some have contended President Bush did before leaving office - with little fear
that impeachment will cut short his term in office. After all, as Brian Kalt has
noted, presidential self-dealing is to be most expected when the President is
preparing to leave office and the usual disincentives are of diminished sig-
141. See Kobil, supra note 18, at 617. Ford's approval rating dropped from 66% before the pardon
to 50% following the pardon. See Boudin, supra note 4, at 2 n.9.
142. See Er parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 121 (1925).
143. Ferguson's wire, Miriam E. "Ma" Ferguson, was elected to the office of govemor notwithstan-
ding her husband's impeachment. Ironically, the Texas legislature subsequently tried to pardon "Pa"
Ferguson, but the bill was held violative of the Texas Constitution in Ferguson v. Wilcox, 28 S.W.2d 526
(Tex. 1930). See Coleen Klasmeier, Note, Towards a New Understanding of Capital Clemency and
Procedural Due Process, 75 B.U. L. REv. 1507, 1535 n.165 (1995).
144. See SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES: PARDON, supra note 60, at 150-53, for a full account
of Walton's impeachme-It.
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nificance."45 Even so, impeachment is still possible following resignation, for the
purposes of stripping the impeached official of his pension and entitlements.'"
Even if post-resignation impeachment would be largely symbolic, the infamy of
being forever remembered as the President impeached for abuse of the pardon
power must weigh heavily on any executive contemplating such abuse. Though
these political checks are weakest at the point where abuse of the pardon power is
to be most feared - at the end of a second term, or when impeachment seems
likely - still the desire to salvage one's popularity and preserve one's image in
historical memory will be strong influences.
F. Pardon Abrogates a Witness' Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-
incrimination
In at least one important respect, a pardon will actually facilitate, not hinder, the
disclosure of information. While blocking a trial of the recipient, the same pardon
will have the effect of abrogating the recipient's privilege against self-incrimination
should he be called as a witness in another trial or before a grand jury or
congressional investigating committee.
In Brown v. Walker,47 the Supreme Court held that legislative immunity, if
sufficiently broad, dispensed with the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.'" The Court noted that the Fifth Amendment shields only testimony
which may lead to a criminal prosecution, not testimony which may be disgraceful
or lead to loss of reputation or economic injury.'49 In other words, if one's
testimony would not place one in danger of criminal prosecution, then the Fifth
Amendment will not protect that testimony. Therefore, the Court held that granting
legislative immunity would abrogate the privilege," going on to find that:
[i]f... the object of the [privilege against self-incrimination] be to
secure the witness against a criminal prosecution, which might be aided
directly or indirectly by his disclosure, then, if no such prosecution be
possible - in other words, if his testimony operates as a complete
pardon for the offense to which it relates - a statute absolutely
securing to him such immunity from prosecution would satisfy the
demands of the clause in question."'
Subsequent cases have significantly redefined the scope of the Fifth Amendment's
protection. In Kastigar v. United States,' for example, the Court held that
absolute immunity was not necessary to compel a witness to testify, but that
145. See Brian Kalt, Pardon Me?: The Constitutional Case Against Presidential Self-Pardons, 106
YALE LJ. 779, 798-99 (1996).
146. See supra note 116.
147. 161 U.S. 591 (1895).
148. See id. at 595.
149. See id. at 596.
150. Id. at 595.
151. Id.
152. 406 U.S. 441 (1972), reh'g denied, 408 U.S. 931 (1972).
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transactional immunity - exclusion of testimony and any evidence gathered as a
result of that testimony - would suffice.' Still, there has been no deviation from
the central principle that a witness may be compelled to testify, so long as he is
granted immunity that is co-extensive with the privilege against self-incrimination,
however defined.
A pardon is akin to absolute immunity, since an individual cannot be prosecuted
for an offense once pardoned for that offense. Thus, the Court in Brown stated in
dicta that, "if a witness has already received a pardon, he cannot longer set up his
privilege, since he stands with respect to such offense as if it had never been
committed."'' " It should be apparent that, if the lesser transactional immunity
suffices to allow the compulsion of testimony, then the absolute immunity provided
by a pardon will have a similar effect.
Pardon is distinct from legislative immunity in one other important respect. A
pardon carries with it an inference of guilt that is absent from a grant of legislative
immunity. 55 In Burdick v. United States,'" the Court used this distinction to find
that a person could refuse to accept a pardon." George Burdick was an editor of
the New York Tribune who invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege and refused to
answer before a grand jury certain questions relating to an article on customs fraud.
President Wilson pardoned Burdick in an effort to force him to divulge his sources
for the article. When he still refused to answer, he was fined for contempt and
imprisoned until he would agree to answer the questions. The Court found that
"[e]scape by confession of guilt implied in the acceptance of a pardon may be
rejected, - preferring to be the victim of the law rather than its acknowledged
transgressor - pref.rring death even to such certain infamy.""' Although Burdick
establishes a right to refuse a pardon, it leaves untouched the conclusion that a
pardon, once accepted, abrogates the privilege against self-incrimination.
If a pardon accepted removes the privilege against self-incrimination, and a
pardon refused keeps. it intact, then the timing of acceptance is a potentially
important consideration. Could a witness, for example, refuse acceptance of a
pardon when testifying before Congress, but then invoke the pardon should he
subsequently be tried for an offense? The idea is not as far-fetched as it appears.
A pardon is nothing more than a document signed by the President. There is no
space at the bottom requiring the recipient to sign it, no "I accept" or "I refuse" box
to check. When Burdick "refused" the pardon, he still had in his hand the document
stating that he had been pardoned for any offense related to his article on customs
fraud.
153. See id. at 4413. Some commentators advocate an even narrower reading of the Fifth
Amendment. Amar & I:ttow, for example, read the Fifth Amendment as requiring immunity only for
incriminating testimony itself, not any of the "fruits" of that testimony. See Akhil R. Amar & Renee B.
Lettow, FifthAmendmnent First Principles: The Self Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REv. 857 (1995).
154. Brown, 161 U.S. at 599.
155. See Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79, 94 (1915).
156. 236 U.S. 79 (1915).
157. Id. at 94.
158. Id. at 90-91.
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The idea that there is no acceptance or refusal of a pardon in the abstract, only
in the context of specific proceedings, is derived from Wilson. In that case, where
a prisoner had stated that he did not wish to avail himself of a pardon which had
been granted him, the Court held that a pardon, like any other relevant fact, has to
be brought "judicially before the court, whether by plea, motion or otherwise."''
If a pardon is granted before conviction, it might be argued that whether the
offender has accepted or rejected the pardon is indeterminate until the moment of
pleading, when he must either plead the pardon in bar of his prosecution or fail to
do so and face trial. If he were brought before Congress prior to trial, for example,
who is to say whether he has accepted his pardon for the purposes of determining
his privilege against self-incrimination?
No court case has yet faced this issue, probably because it would only be
important in the obscure case of a pre-conviction pardon (which are very seldom
granted),"w where the offender is called to testify before a grand jury or Congress
and refuses to accept his pardon' but then tries to plead it in a subsequent criminal
prosecution. Still, it may be doubted whether the deed of pardon would remain
valid after the recipient rejects it once under oath. An analogy to a conditional
pardon might be drawn. Conditions to a pardon may not selectively be consented
to; a conditional pardon is an all-or-nothing proposition."' Similarly, a pardon
recipient cannot pick and choose the occasions on which he wants to invoke the
pardon, using it when it is to his advantage but keeping it in his pocket when it
might force him to testify. Consider also the games that a pardon recipient could
engage in - refusing to use his pardon prior to conviction in the hopes that he will
be acquitted at trial, but then invoking it after conviction to avoid punishment if he
should happen to be convicted. It seems probable that either Congress or a grand
jury would be able to force a pardon recipient to decide whether to accept or reject
a pardon when they call him to testify, even prior to trial.
The President is thus in a quandary when he wants to use the pardon power to
help a witness remain silent. On one hand, granting the pardon eliminates the
possibility of a trial and the potential disclosure of information during the course of
the trial. However, the very same pardon exposes the witness to contempt for
refusing to testify should she be called before a grand jury or Congress, where that
testimony might have been shielded by the Fifth Amendment before the pardon.
The pardon eliminates the possibility of extracting information in one forum, but
facilitates its extraction in other forums.
11. Abuses of the Pardon Power Revisited
By way of summary, it might be helpful to revisit the cases of Nixon, Wein-
berger, McDougal, and Lewinsky to see exactly what effect the pardons (or, in the
159. United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. 150, 161 (1833).
160. Only three out of a total of 2314 pardons during the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon
administrations were granted before conviction. A Pardon for Nixon and Watergate Is Back, CONG. Q.
WKLY., Sep. 14, 1974, at 2458.
161. See Hoffa v. Saxbe, 378 F. Supp. 1221, 1242 (D.D.C. 1974).
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latter two cases, hypothetical pardons) had or could have had on disclosure of infor-
mation. Each of these cases illustrates that the pardon, by itself, cannot operate to
prevent disclosure of information. In each instance, there were methods of
compelling disclosure that were not impacted by the pardon. The failure to obtain
information was the result of a lack of political will to utilize these other
mechanisms, not because of the pardon enabling the offender to remain silent with
impunity.
A. Richard Nixon
If it was believed that the full story of Watergate had yet to be revealed at the
time of Nixon's pardon, Congress might have created a committee to investigate, for
example, whether additional congressional oversight legislation was necessary.
President Nixon could have been called to testify before this committee, and the
pardon would in no way have protected him. If he refused to testify, he could have
been held in contempt of Congress, which, as I have suggested, President Ford
would have been unable to pardon. Even if it was within President Ford's power to
pardon contempt against Congress, a second pardon would have been necessary,
since the first applied only to acts committed while Nixon was President. In view
of public suspicion that there was a deal between Nixon and Ford, and the
widespread disapproval of the first pardon, it seems highly unlikely that a second
pardon for perjury or contempt would have been forthcoming.
Even if President Ford had been willing to continue to protect Nixon, the
possibility of impeaching President Nixon to strip him of his pension and
entitlements remained open. One might have expected much the same testimony and
witnesses in the impeachment proceedings as would have occurred during any
criminal trial. And, as I have suggested, the impeachment exception to the pardon
power bars pardons not only for impeached officials, but for witnesses called to
testify in impeachment proceedings.
Thus, Congress was not left powerless by President Ford's pardon of Nixon. The
failure to obtain the full story of Watergate, if that is what happened, was a failure
of political will to us- the full powers available to Congress, not a breakdown in the
balance of powers.
B. Caspar Weinberger
Lawrence Walsh was simply wrong that President Bush blocked further
investigation into the Iran-Contra affair by pardoning Caspar Weinberger. 1 If
Walsh believed that the trial would have revealed the full scope of President Bush's
involvement in the scandal, then why not simply call Weinberger before a grand
jury to investigate Bush? Walsh apparently was aware of this possibility, but it was
never pursued. The pardon would not have protected Weinberger against a civil
contempt citation if lie had refused to testify. Furthermore, since Bush would have
been out of office by the time Weinberger was called to testify, a second pardon for
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Weinberger if he perjured himself would not likely have been granted by President
Clinton.
Alternatively, Weinberger could have been called by Congress to testify about
President Bush's knowledge of the Iran-Contra affair. Congress could have justified
such proceedings as necessary to determine whether to begin impeachment
proceedings against President Bush. As in President Nixon's case, the fact that
President Bush had already left office would not have barred impeachment to strip
him of his pension and entitlements. Again, the failure to extract information from
Caspar Weinberger was a political failure to utilize the available alternatives to a
criminal trial.
Finally, the pardon of Weinberger could have backfired, insofar as the pardon
stripped him of his privilege against self-incrimination. As Brian Kalt has noted, the
pardon was risky, and it paid off for political reasons, not constitutional ones.1
63
C. Susan McDougal
Speculation that President Clinton could have used a pardon to "spring felon
Susan McDougal for her services protecting the Clintons from the truth"'" was off
the mark. Ms. McDougal was sentenced to two years imprisonment for fraud as
well as up to seventeen months for a contempt citation for refusing to answer
certain questions before a grand jury relating to the Clintons' Whitewater affairs.'"
President Clinton could have pardoned her fraud conviction, but he was powerless
to "spring" her for the civil contempt citation. Although her imprisonment for
contempt was for a determinate period of time, her contempt would have been
purged at any time if she had agreed to answer the questions posed to her by the
grand jury.'" According to the Shillitani case, this makes the contempt civil rather
than criminal." As explained above, a pardon may not be granted for a civil
contempt.
Even if her contempt were considered criminal, double jeopardy would not have
prevented her from being cited for civil contempt and recommitted to prison on an
indeterminate sentence had she been pardoned. And even if the foregoing
conclusion is mistaken, and Clinton could have secured her release through a
pardon, this still would not have shielded her entirely. The grand jury could have
again posed questions to her, and any intransigence on her part would not have been
covered by the pardon; a future contempt citation could not be covered in a pardon
for previous contempts. Clinton might issue successive pardons, but an all-out battle
between the President and the courts, with the President blatantly using his powers
to conceal information, would have put him in a politically unenviable situation, to
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say the least. In any/ case, such use of the pardon power could only have continued
so long as Clinton held office.
D. Monica Lewinsky
As noted above, Andrew Shapiro advocated a pardon for Monica Lewinsky on
the theory that she would not have had to tell special prosecutor Kenneth Starr
anything following such a pardon."r Recall the background leading up to this
proposal: Lewinsky had testified under oath, but Kenneth Starr suspected she had
not been entirely truthful and wished to depose her again. This placed Lewinsky in
a bind; if she changed her story, she risked being prosecuted for perjury for her
initial testimony. However, she could have invoked the Fifth Amendment upon
being deposed again, refusing to answer questions on the basis that her answers
could have incriminated her.
Let us examine what would have happened had she been pardoned for any
offenses, such as perjury, committed during her initial testimony. No longer under
threat of a perjury prosecution, all the incentives would be on her to tell the truth -
which is, according, to Shapiro, just what the President would have wanted to
conceal. He hypothesized that, if called before a grand jury, Lewinsky could have
been evasive or might have suffered a convenient lapse of memory with im-
punity." Why this would have been so is unclear; her Fifth Amendment privilege
abrogated by the pardon, Lewinsky would have been compelled to testify truthfully.
Any "memory lapses" would have been belied by her first deposition. Had she been
pardoned, she couldn't have been prosecuted for perjury committed during her first
deposition, but nothing about the pardon could have prevented use of that testimony
offered as evidence in a trial for a subsequent commission of perjury.
Shapiro's second point, that a pardon would have stripped Starr of his only
bargaining chip, the promise of immunity, falls equally flat. Having been pardoned
and thereby having lost her Fifth Amendment immunity, Lewinsky could have been
compelled to testify under threat of contempt without the need for an offer of
immunity. As things turned out, Lewinsky was granted immunity on July 28, 1998.
The "bargain" was, in essence, granting Lewinsky immunity in return for her
agreeing not to invoke the Fifth Amendment. Had she been stripped of this
protection by a pardon, Starr would have needed no "bargaining chip" at all.
Far from enabling the President to conceal information, a grant of pardon in this
instance would have actually facilitated Starr's investigation. Clinton did well not
to pardon her, if he was seeking to prevent disclosure of embarrassing facts.
Conclusion
Witnesses will lie, conspirators will remain silent, and accomplices will even sit
in prison rather than reveal information. Nothing can ensure that complete, truthful
information will be extracted from those who know it. Weighing the balances, some
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will always prefer the sanction to whatever detriment they perceive disclosure will
cause them.
The pardon power exacerbates none of these problems. Civil contempt and
contempt of Congress are beyond the reach of the pardon power, and are adequate
to assure Congress' and the courts' ability to compel testimony. The political checks
on abuse of the pardon power are real, and the use of pardon to cover up
information will be tempered by the fact that the pardon abrogates a witness'
privilege against self-incrimination. If our system does not adequately obtain
information, especially in cases of high executive misconduct, then our attention
should be focused on the political will to use available means to extract that
information, not on the illusory power of executive clemency to conceal it.
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